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LEGAL ACADEMIC TRAINING REQUIRES TEACHING LAW FROM A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
(-)J.B.M. Vranken1 and (-) C.E.C. Jansen2 
 
In this paper, we will present and explain our opinion that teaching law in a compara-
tive way, as part of the transnational orientation of law students, is a prerequisite for 
university legal education being qualified as academic. When supporting the teach-
ing of law comparatively, our perspective is neither the preparation of students for an 
alleged forthcoming unified or harmonised European law, nor the reform of the pre-
sent law faculties into European law schools, which would then become the cradle of 
a new type of European lawyers trained to work in all European countries.3 Our per-
spective is the improvement of the academic quality of university legal education. We 
think that, among other things, teaching law in a comparative way is an indispensa-
ble contribution to such an improvement. In the illustrations of our point of view, we 
concentrate on private law. 
 
The perennial discussion on legal education 
A former Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and Science, Job Cohen, once asked 
what came first: legal education or the discussion on legal education.4 In the Nether-
lands, we are already experiencing the fourth broad discussion on the topic since the 
Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging (Dutch Lawyers Association) devoted its an-
nual meeting to it in 1972.5 Once again, the major topic is the emphasis on the aca-
                                            
1  (-)J.B.M. Vranken holds a chair in Methodology of Private Law at Tilburg University, Depart-
ment of Private Law. 
2  (-)C.E.C. Jansen is senior lecturer at Tilburg University, Department of Private Law. 
3 Having read a vast number of works using the method of comparative law, Esin Örücü, Critical 
Comparative Law: Considering Paradoxes for Legal Systems in Transition, preadvies Neder-
landse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, Deventer 1999, p. 5, mentions other objectives, 
e.g. the reconciliation or convergence of common and civil law, an aid to international practice 
of law, and, long ago, a tool for research to reach a universal theory of law, and an aid to world 
peace. 
4  M.J. Cohen, ‘De opleiding: speciaal?’, in: Gevraagd: ‘jurist voor morgen’, Bureau Symposia 
Nijmegen 1991, p. 13. 
5  In the early eighties, the legal curriculum was restructured into a two-phase programme of one 
propaedeutic year and three graduate years. In the nineties, the influence of Europe made 
clear that, in a short time, the dominant orientation to national law in legal education would no 
longer be self-evident. However, after an enthusiastic start interest faded and there were no 
drastic reforms, besides some occasional and slight adaptations. In 1996 the rapidly increas-
demic training to be offered by universities in order to clearly distinguish them from 
institutions of higher vocational training. It is generally acknowledged that offering 
academic training is inherent to university legal education.6 Nevertheless, when car-
rying out this objective there is a lot of confusion. What makes university education 
‘academic’ and what is meant by ‘academic training’? And how does this relate to 
what is further considered to be an aim of university legal education, namely, prepar-
ing students for specific legal professions such as lawyers, judges, and notaries?  
The Joined Declaration of the European Ministers of Education and Science, 
who convened in Bologna on the 19th of June 1999, revived the discussion on legal 
education. In the Declaration,(-) the Ministers promised to adapt the university curric-
ula to a system essentially based on two main cycles: undergraduate and graduate. 
Access to the second cycle requires the successful completion of the first cycle, i.e. 
a Bachelor’s programme taking at least three years. The second cycle consists of a 
Master’s programme and lasts one or two years.7 The rationale behind this Bachelor-
Master operation, as it was soon called, is to make curricula comparable and, there-
fore, to remove current problems with respect to the exchange of students, lectur-
ers and knowledge and to stimulate their mobility.8 In other words: the former Ger-
man Wanderstudent should become a European figure.  
                                                                                                                                        
ing numbers of students became one of the reasons to limit the curriculum to a maximum of 
four years (with only a few exceptions). The 1999 Joined Declaration of Bologna, mentioned 
later in the main text, is the basis for the current discussion on the topic in the Netherlands. 
6  See, e.g., B. de Witte and C. Forder (eds.), The Common Law of Europe and the Future of 
Legal Education, Maastricht 1991; S.C.J.J. Kortmann (ed.), Legal Education in the Netherlands 
in a Comparative Context, Nijmegen 1995; E.H. Hondius, Juridisch onderwijs in vergelijkend 
perspectief, preadvies Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, Deventer 1998; 
W.J.M. Bekkers, R.M. Koning and N.J. Vette (eds.), Rechten in Utrecht. De academische stu-
die in verleden, heden en toekomst, Deventer 2002; F. Bruinsma, ‘De ondraaglijke lichtheid 
van de rechtenstudie’, NJB 2000, pp. 1371-1374; NJB-special Van Meesters en Masters, NJB 
2001, pp. 153-165, e.g. A.M. Hol, ‘Recht als ervaring. Over academische vorming in de juridi-
sche opleiding’, NJB 2001, pp. 158-163; M. Nolen, ‘De rechtenstudie van de toekomst of de 
hoop op diepgang, uitdaging en bevlogenheid. Congresverslag: Bachelor- en masterstructuur 
en inrichting van de academische rechtenstudie’, Ars Aequi 51 (2002), pp. 412-417. 
7  In the Netherlands, the first Kok administration (1994-1998) proposed similar plans, based 
upon a report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy of January 1995, but these plans 
vanished in a discussion on the number of years students are entitled to spend at universities: 
five instead of four years. 
8  According to G.E. van Maanen, ‘Een uniforme Bachelor/Masters-structuur voor de Neder-
landse juridische opleidingen?’, WPNR 6418 (2000), pp. 667-668, this rationale of increasing 
the mobility of students should be the real reason to teach law in a comparative way. For us, 
teaching law in a comparative way follows from the claim that university legal education should 
offer students academic training. 
Although the Bologna Declaration did not contain suggestions for the reform  
of legal education as regards content,9 some Dutch law faculties appear to have 
used the Declaration as a starting point for a critical evaluation thereof. Given the 
purpose of academic legal education, we think that law faculties should grant a more 
prominent place in their curricula not only to topics such as methodology, legal rea-
soning, the philosophical status of the study of law and the relation of law to social 
sciences, but also to the issue of ‘transnational orientation’, i.e. the ability of law stu-
dents to mentally and physically cross the borders of their national legal system and 
culture and, as a result thereof, to extend the boundaries of their legal minds. One of 
the questions of future legal education should be the development of such an abil-
ity. How could this objective be realised? 
 
Legal education and comparative law 
There are many ways to develop the ‘transnational orientation’ of law students. In the 
next sections, we will concentrate on a particular method, i.e. the introduction of 
comparative law in legal education. Obviously, there are other methods as well. 
Firstly, one might think of paying more attention to European and interna-
tional law in legal curricula. It could be argued that law students, apart from their own 
national law, should also study law primarily developed by international and suprana-
tional organisations, courts and treaties.10 Another way in which the ‘transnational 
orientation’ of law students could be developed is the internationalisation of legal 
education, e.g. by encouraging students to take part in foreign law courses at their 
own universities or in students exchange programmes (such as Erasmus) at a for-
eign university. (-) 
We consider these other methods to be intrinsic and self-evident parts of cur-
rent legal education and not related to comparative law. As regards the increased 
attention for European and international aspects of the various fields of law, for in-
stance, national private law cannot be taught without taking into account the enor-
mous influence of European Community Directives and decisions of the European 
                                            
7 However, both the Bachelor’s programme and the Master’s programme need the approval of 
the National Accreditation Board, which implies that the programmes have to meet certain 
quality standards.  
10  Obviously, it is particularly EC law we have in mind here. Formal (-) implementation or ratifica-
tion by a national legislator may still be required for making such a law binding on a country’s 
citizens. 
Court of Justice and of the European Court on Human Rights, e.g. on damages, 
government(-) liability, access to justice, and so on. As to the second way of develop-
ing a ‘transnational orientation’, i.e. by means of internationalising legal education, 
we certainly recommend that the initiatives mentioned in the examples above be 
maintained and even be increased. But again, they have nothing to do with what we 
have in mind: the introduction of comparative law in legal education. 
 
Why law should be taught from a comparative legal perspective 
Depending on how comparative law is to be introduced in legal education,11 we sug-
gested above that this would help students to widen their perspective and to prevent 
them from becoming too much attached to their national legal system and culture. 
We believe this is essential to a student’s academic training. Legal education should 
stimulate students to critically reflect upon their own legal system. By confronting 
them with the arguments and solutions on the basis of which a particular problem or 
a more general issue is analysed and solved in other legal cultures, students will no 
longer take for granted the way in which similar problems or issues are dealt with in 
their own legal system. 
This line of approach would further contribute to legal education becoming 
more academic, in the sense that it would force both teachers and students not to 
dwell upon the technical details inherent in a particular legal system. Legal educa-
tion does not become ‘academic’ by merely conveying knowledge regarding the 
technical operation of an abstract set of rules. It requires a more fundamental and 
ongoing debate on general concepts, principles, ethics and values. Both teachers 
and students should consider and reconsider the (-) arguments underlying a rea-
soning that seeks to establish a satisfying and consistent approach to and solution 
for a concrete problem or a more general issue. As a consequence, they will inevita-
bly have to face the possible influence of law on society and ask themselves what 
law is able (-) to do in society. This brings us to the question how law should be 
taught from a comparative legal perspective. 
                                            
11  We will address this issue in the next section of our paper. 
 
How we would teach law from a comparative legal perspective 
There are many ways to introduce comparative law into legal education. (-) A sliding 
scale could be drawn on which several options can be identified. On one side of 
that scale, we identify the – as we call it – most traditional option. This option in-
volves a teaching programme that starts by concentrating on the national legal cul-
ture of the students involved. More particularly, students are taught the abstract 
constructs of their national legal system (-) and the application of the rules em-
bedded in that system to concrete problems. This approach will be followed until the 
final stage of their education has been reached. At that stage, comparative law is in-
troduced in the teaching programme. Students will then be shown, at a basic level 
and from the perspective of their own national legal system, how foreign legal sys-
tems are constructed and how they operate as sets of concepts and rules. Eventu-
ally, they will learn how foreign legal systems – again, at an abstract level of rules 
and concepts – are different from or similar to their own national legal system. 
We are not in favour of this traditional option. We support a more progressive 
option to be found on the other side of the scale referred to above.12 That option 
would consist in introducing comparative law right from the start of the legal edu-
cation of the students involved. The teaching programme and teaching process 
would not be based on the dominant perspective of their national legal system and 
culture, nor would the teaching process start with explaining law in terms of an ab-
stract system of concepts and rules, which the students are then trained to apply to 
concrete problems. Instead, we would favour the opposite approach by letting the 
process start from the analysis of either a concrete problem or a more generally de-
fined issue. (-) The focus of such an analysis would be on identifying the various 
                                            
12  Neither the traditional nor the progressive approach appears to be taken in legal education in 
England, France, Germany and the Netherlands. We asked our research assistant, Jeroen 
Kruis, to make a rough survey of the comparative legal content of compulsory private law 
courses (undergraduate and graduate) taught at some important law faculties in the countries 
mentioned: Bristol, Cambridge, King’s College (London), London School of Economics, Man-
chester, Nottingham, Oxford, Queen Mary & Westfield College (London), University College 
(London), Warwick, Bonn, Freiburg, Hamburg, Heidelberg, München, Münster, Passau, Re-
gensburg, Saarbrücken, Aix-Marseille-3, Bordeaux-4, Lilles, Lyon-3, Nantes, Paris-1, Paris-2, 
Paris-5, Paris-10, Paris-11, Paris-12, University of Amsterdam, Free University (Amsterdam), 
Groningen, Leiden, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, Tilburg and Utrecht. The survey shows 
that very few law faculties offer students introductory courses on comparative law. Moreover, 
apart from Maastricht, it seems that none of these law faculties offer compulsory private law 
courses from a comparative legal perspective.  
ways in which these everyday problems and general issues are approached and 
solved throughout the legal cultures studied by the students. In addition, they would 
have to concentrate on the question what the underlying arguments are that will 
eventually have to be weighed and valued in any of the various legal cultures. Stu-
dents should then be able to formulate a proper approach and solution for them-
selves, given the results of the comparative legal analysis. At a later stage, they 
would have to redefine both this preferred approach or solution and its underlying 
arguments, and determine whether these arguments can be consistently fitted into 
the system of rules and concepts of their own national legal culture. Obviously, stu-
dents should be able to formulate value judgments if it turns out to be difficult or even 
impossible to fit the approach or solution preferred into their legal system. In doing 
so, they would also have to concentrate on the question whether the arguments and 
the approach or solution preferred can be generalised for the purpose of future ref-
erence when similar concrete problems or general issues occur. 
 
Two illustrations 
We will further illustrate the progressive option outlined above by giving two exam-
ples. The first example deals with a concrete problem, a ‘wrongful birth’ case. Such 
cases have occurred – and probably still occur – in many legal cultures. In a compul-
sory private law course, a wrongful birth case could be used as a model to determine 
the scope of protection offered by the law of obligations. The case raises fundamen-
tal questions, e.g. on the relation between ethics and law, and whether law should be 
involved in personal, intimate matters like family planning or birth control. Does the 
doctor have to compensate the parents’ costs of bringing up the child? When study-
ing the Dutch Supreme Court’s decision of 1997,13 students would learn that the 
Court allowed compensation, although limited to the average costs of bringing up a 
child and only until the child turns 18. The Court’s decision is primarily based upon 
Articles 6:74, 6:96 and 6:98 of the Dutch Civil Code. Analysis of these Articles led the 
Court to the conclusion that the Code is in principle not opposed to allowing com-
pensation to the parents. That conclusion is followed by an evaluation of arguments 
that might have induced the Court to go back on its initial conclusion. However, the 
outcome of the evaluation did not change the Court’s mind. One may wonder 
                                            
13  HR 21 February 1997, NJ 1999, 145, with note by C.J.H. Brunner. 
whether such a change was to be expected, given the approach taken by the Court. 
Nevertheless, the additional evaluation is remarkable because it is rather unusual in 
the Dutch Supreme Court’s way of legal reasoning. 
Does the approach of the Supreme Court sufficiently provoke Dutch students 
to reflect critically upon their own legal system concerning the scope of protection of-
fered by the law of obligations in personal, intimate matters like wrongful birth? We 
think Dutch students should not start with analysing a typical wrongful birth case from 
the perspective of the relevant legal provisions of the Dutch Civil Code or of any 
other Civil Code. These provisions merely provide a framework within which the cru-
cial arguments have to be weighed and valued. Therefore, it is essential to get to 
know these arguments. The best way to achieve this objective is by having students 
also read the landmark cases on wrongful birth in other legal cultures,14 challenging 
them not only to list all crucial arguments that are eventually weighed and valued, but 
also to find out how this weighing and valuing is carried out. This comparative legal 
analysis would show students that supreme courts in other countries may address a 
wrongful birth case in a way quite different from that of the Dutch Supreme Court, 
and that the same arguments can be used to reject a claim for compensation of the 
costs of bringing up the child. Why is that? What are the real underlying arguments 
in deciding a wrongful birth case? Ethical considerations? Policy arguments? Insur-
ability? Cultural differences? We think these are the fundamental questions that 
ought to be discussed, instead of lingering on the mere technical aspects of current 
law regarding wrongful birth. 
The second example to illustrate our point of view that teaching law compara-
tively would contribute to the academic level of university education, involves a more 
general issue. In all Western societies, it is regarded as the government’s duty to of-
fer citizens a procedure to help them solve their legal disputes in a court of law. In-
herent in this duty is the prerogative of the government to declare that it is only within 
the framework of such a procedure that citizens can be granted a title to enforce their 
rights against other citizens with the help of private law means. The power that is 
thus conferred on citizens, is far-reaching. Strict and clear rules are required. Tradi-
                                            
14  As for English law, this would obviously be McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board (Scotland) 
[1999] 4 All ER 963. A German case to start with would be BGH 27 June 1995, NJW 1995, pp. 
2407-2410. 
tionally, this is the field of civil procedural law and of the law of attachment and en-
forcement.  
 Nowadays, procedural law is generally considered to be very much orientated 
to practice.15 Textbooks on procedural law confirm this view. They offer an overview 
of current civil procedure, limited to one’s own national legal system. Students are 
acquainted with almost all steps and all legal events that may occur in the course of 
ordinary and extraordinary proceedings, and also with the very extensive and techni-
cal rules on attachment and enforcement. The explanation in the textbooks includes 
both the many questions that have arisen in the past and the relevant case law, to-
gether with the doctrines that have been developed to answer them. The student has 
to study all this rather detailed information and is taught to apply the knowledge 
gained to concrete cases. Of course, essential principles such as the right to be 
heard or the requirement of an impartial and independent court, are dealt with as 
well, just as are new developments, but the way in which this is done is usually the 
same, namely, on the basis of current law. This means that the general approach in 
teaching procedural law is explaining the law as it stands, in a predominantly non-
critical way and almost exclusively limited to national law. This approach does not 
differ from the one that is taken in institutions of higher vocational education and in 
post-graduate professional training for judges and lawyers. 
 We do not think this approach meets the academic standards we have in 
mind. Instead of focusing on details of national law, here and now, academic educa-
tion requires a more reflective attitude. We mention three topics in this context, which 
partly result from a comparative analysis, and should partly be taught comparatively 
to gain a better and more profound understanding. We apologise for dealing with 
these topics only briefly, due to lack of space. 
 The first topic is the relation between procedural law and substantive law. It is 
generally held that this is a unilateral relation: substantive law confers rights and 
imposes duties, whereas procedural law is nothing more than a means (-) to en-
sure the correct determination of these rights and duties and to provide the parties 
with a title to enforce the court’s decision. We think this is a one-sided view. The 
other side is that procedural law has its own dynamics. To a certain extent, it creates 
                                            
15  Perhaps this is the reason why the level of scholarly study is rather poor in many countries, 
e.g. in the Netherlands. See C.H. van Rhee, ‘Civil Procedure: A European Ius Commune’, 
substantive law. With this we have in mind the phenomenon of judge-made law, the 
creation of which follows especially from the task of the highest courts. Large parts of 
substantive private law consist of case law. It is generally acknowledged that case 
law is very important, if not indispensable for the development of private law in this 
modern age. This phenomenon should be discussed in classes on civil procedure, 
e.g. to reconsider the current system of judicial adjudication in which it is rather coin-
cidental whether cases go through to the highest courts. Is that the best way to or-
ganise a phenomenon of such an important public interest? Analysing the phenome-
non from a comparative legal perspective could help revealing and balancing the ar-
guments at stake. 
 The second topic studies litigation in courts of law from the perspective of dis-
pute resolution. Many other techniques and means to solve disputes between citi-
zens are available in society, such as arbitration, mediation, conciliation, facilitation, 
early neutral evaluation, mini-trial, pre-action protocols, consumer complaints tribu-
nals, binding advice(-) and complaints codes. A comparative tour shows that alterna-
tive techniques and means, above all mediation, have started an almost sensational 
victory march through many countries. How to judge them in relation to procedures 
followed in a court of law? In recent reforms of civil procedure, e.g. in Germany, Eng-
land and Wales, (-) the influence of the alternatives can already be observed, be-
cause in these countries the courts are now under a statutory duty to try more of-
ten to reach friendly settlements at any stage of the proceedings (-), or, at least, to 
encourage the parties to use an alternative procedure to resolve their dispute. Is this 
a development that deserves support? What are the prevailing arguments pro and 
con? 
 The third topic concerns the content of procedural law more directly. The 
starting point is the criticism on the current procedural law in the Netherlands and the 
proposals to reform it. A comparative tour shows that this criticism is expressed al-
most worldwide. The civil litigation’s shortcomings are even defined in almost the 
same terms, namely, it takes too much time and money, it is inefficient and unable 
to meet the requirements of a modern service (-)organisation. It is interesting to note 
that not only the shortcomings, but also the proposals to resolve them point in the 
same direction. To mention only two of them: the current three-tier system of first in-
                                                                                                                                        
ERPL 2000, pp. 589-611 (593). In the United Kingdom, procedural law has even been denied 
stance, appeal and cassation or revision which exists in most civil law countries, is as 
such unknown in common law and in Scandinavian countries. One of the major 
points of discussion is the function of appeal. In most civil law countries,16 appeal is 
a full second chance (re-hearing), whereas in common law countries and in Scan-
dinavia it merely is a review of the decision in first instance (whether or not in combi-
nation with a system of leave to appeal). A discussion of this issue recently started in 
the Netherlands, not only in respect to civil procedure, but also in respect to crimi-
nal, administrative and tax procedural law.17 Again, what are the arguments pro and 
con?  
 A second proposal to improve civil procedure concerns the question of 
whose responsibility it should be to gather the relevant information on the basis 
of which the judge has to decide. (-) Answering this question forces both lecturers 
and students to study some very fundamental issues, e.g.: 
- the autonomy of parties and their entitlement to defend their rights in the best 
possible way versus a duty to inform and to co-operate in order to have the 
dispute solved efficiently and effectively;  
- the public interest in such an effective and efficient system of judicial adjudica-
tion (-) also requires a more active role of the judge (catchword: case man-
agement). This would differ from what is traditionally regarded as his role, i.e. 
mainly a passive one; 
- differentiation of proceedings, in which the resources available are allotted in 
appropriate shares. The question is whether this is in accordance with the 
principles of doing justice(-). 
 
Teaching materials 
Teaching law in the manner outlined above requires adequate teaching materials. 
There are not many adequate textbooks yet, but such books may easily be devel-
                                                                                                                                        
the status of academic discipline. Only very recently, this situation has changed. 
16  Exceptions are Austria and Germany. 
17  See F. Hovens, ‘Het civiele hoger beroep in de toekomst’, Ars Aequi 2001, pp. 866-874; J.E.M. 
Polak, ‘Hoger beroep in het bestuursrecht’, Ars Aequi 2001, pp. 622-629; P. van Schie and R. 
den Ouden, ‘Belasting-rechtspraak in twee feitelijke instanties’, NJB 2002, pp. 2176-2181; 
M.S. Groenhuijsen and G. Knigge, Onderzoeksproject Strafvordering 2001, third interim report, 
Tilburg/Groningen 2002; W.D.H. Asser, H.A. Groen, J.B.M. Vranken and I.N. Tzankova, Fun-
damentele herbezinning Nederlands burgerlijk procesrecht, interim report, 2002, Chapter 9 
(forthcoming). 
oped, particularly if legal scholars from various legal cultures (-) join hands.18 Be-
sides, landmark decisions on concrete problems occurring throughout Europe are 
rather easily available in the legal cultures concerned. However, they will not always 
be accessible to every student due to language barriers. This problem could be 
solved if the case law of the supreme courts of all European countries would, in the 
near future, not only be published in the national language of the country concerned, 
but also in a language read and understood by most European lawyers. Therefore, 
we recommend the translation (-) of such case law into English. This would not only 
support the teaching of law from a comparative legal perspective, it would also stimu-
late comparative legal research and perhaps even contribute to legal practice. As for 
the total translation costs, we believe they would probably not have to exceed the 
money spent on translating the decisions of the European Court of Justice into the 
languages of the Member States of the European Union. 
 
Concluding remarks 
When developing the ideas written down in this paper, another thought came to our 
minds. We have an (-) impression of how law students in the Netherlands will proba-
bly be educated and trained once the Bachelor-Master operation has been fully com-
pleted. We assume (-) that the three-year Bachelor’s cycle will mainly be used to 
teach students the law as it stands. Although, obviously, not all fields of law will (-) 
be dealt with, students will most likely get a rather broad overview at a sufficiently 
profound level that will enable them to deal with everyday legal problems once they 
enter practice. We further assume that the education of law students will become 
somewhat more academic once they enter the Master’s cycle of either one or two 
years. During that additional and academic training, they will deepen their knowledge 
of one or more general or specialised fields of law. Both cycles appear to contain ele-
ments of professional training. 
 Given the ideas developed in this paper, we question the aforementioned ap-
proach. In our approach, the Bachelor’s cycle would exclusively aim at academic le-
gal training in the manner illustrated  above (-), focusing on general fields of law, 
while the Master’s cycle would focus on one or more specialised areas of law. 
                                            
18  See, e.g., H. Beale, A. Hartkamp, H. Kötz and D. Tallon (eds.), Cases, Materials and Text on 
Contract Law, Oxford and Portland, Oreg. 2002. W. van Gerven (ed.), Cases, Materials and 
Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, Oxford and Portland, Oreg. 2000. 
Teaching the law as it stands as well as the professional training of law students 
should, to our mind, take place in a postgraduate stage after students have entered 
their profession. We consider this training to be the responsibility of legal profes-
sional organisations of lawyers, notaries, company lawyers and judges. In the Neth-
erlands, these organisations have already acknowledged this responsibility and es-
tablished compulsory postgraduate training, lasting at least three years and covering 
not only current law, but also the teaching of practical skills. The intensity of these 
postgraduate training courses could be strengthened, if so desired, (-) by contracting 
out parts of that training to the universities, e.g. courses on new legislation and new 
developments in case law. 
